Moral Hazard, Financial Constraints and Sharecropping in El Oulja by Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Matoussi, Mohamed Salah
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91125 
MORAL HAZARD, FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS 
AND SHARECROPPING IN EL OULJA 
Jean-Jacques Laffont 
California Institute of Technology and 
GREMAQ, Universite de Toulouse 
Mohamed Salah Matoussi 
University of Tunis 
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 667 
March 1988
MORAL HAZARD, FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS 
AND SHARECROPPING IN EL OULJA 
Jean-Jacques Laffont and Mohamed Salah Matoussi 
ABSTRACT 
This paper develops a theory of sharecropping which emphasizes the dual role of moral 
hazard in the provision of effort and financial constraints. The model is compatible with a large 
variety of contracts as observed in the region of El Ouija in Tunisia. 
Using an original set of data including financial data, various tests of the theory are realized. 
The role of financial constraints in the explanation of which type of contract is selected (as well as its 
implications that financial constraints affect effort and therefore output) are strongly supported by 
the data. 
1. Introduction 
MORAL HAZARD, FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS 
AND SHARECROPPING IN EL OULJA 
Jean-Jacques Laffont and Mohamed Salah Matoussi 
California Institute of Technology 
Pasadena, California 91125 
Following A. Smith, all the economists until G. Johnson (1950) have considered 
sharecropping as a "practice which is hurtful to the whole society," an unexplained failure of the 
invisible hand that should be either discouraged by taxation (A. Smith) or slightly improved by 
appropriate sharing of variable factors (Schickele (1941) and Heady (1947)). 
G. Johnson (1950) starts from the empirical observation that "the deviations from optimum 
(induced by crop share contracts) are not immediately obvious from a cursory examination of 
American farms operating under different types of tenure arrangements." He then argues that the 
landlord can approach the desired intensity of cultivation 
by detailed contracting and monitoring, 
by providing other inputs and keeping the size of the individual unit small to decrease (by an 
income effect) the farmer's marginal disutility of labor, 
by the use of short term leases (game theory has only recently formalized this idea in repeated 
moral hazard models). 
However, he admits that theory does not quite explain why sharecropping contracts can do 
as well as rental contracts. 
The next step1 in the understanding of sharecropping was achieved by stressing the risk 
aversion of tenants. The rental contract does not provide an appropriate sharing of risk. 
Sharecropping results from the trade-off between incentives and risk sharing (Stiglitz (1974), see 
also Newbery (1977)). A positive role for sharecropping was finally found as a second best way of 
inducing effort by risk averse tenants. Braverman and Stiglitz (1982) extended this insight by 
showing, as second best theory suggests, that the landlord should intervene in all the markets (credit 
market or input market) in which the tenant transacts to mitigate the inefficiency resulting from the 
above trade-off. 
In this paper we would like to argue that too much emphasis has been put on risk aversion as 
an explanation of sharecropping. Instead, we would like to stress the combination of moral hazard 
and financial constraints as an explanation of sharecropping. 
Section 2 describes the data we will be using to support our theory. Section 3 provides a 
model with financial constraints only, which is confronted with data. A more satisfactory model 
with moral hazard and financial constraints is constructed in Section 4. Production functions 
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including an effort variable are estimated. Risk aversion is discussed in Section 5. Section 6 
extends the analysis and the estimations to the case where the landlord's financial constraint may be 
binding. Section 7 provides some comments on the historical increase of sharecropping since 1970. 
Our findings are summarized in section 8. 
2. The Data 
The survey carried out with the help of the Tunisian National Institute for Statistics has been 
conducted in September-October 1986 in a rural area known as El Oulja, 40 miles west of Tunis. 
One hundred families have been concerned with the survey which includes three types of data. 
(i) General information about the families with, in particular, the number of days worked in 
agriculture. 
(ii) Information for each plot of land defined as a piece of land where only one type of crop is 
carried out each season. Data include size of plot, type of crop, type of labor contract used 
(either wage contract, fix rent contract or sharecropping contract), production levels, precise 
amounts of labor inputs as well as precise amounts of other inputs. 
(iii) Wealth and income data for each family. 
3. Contracting with Financial Constraints 
The production function of an elementary piece of land, called a plot, is written: 
y = ! (le , x) + e f increasing and concave (1) 
where y is output, l is the amount of labor input, e is the average level of effort applied to these 
units of labor (le = f is labor in efficiency units), x is the amount of other material inputs, and e is a 
zero mean random variable. 
Land is owned by landlords who contract with tenants to organize production. A general 
contract is defined by three numbers (a, �. r)  which are, respectively, the share of the product kept 
by the tenant, the share of material inputs paid by the tenant and the sure payment made by the 
tenant to the landlord. This general form of contract encompasses all types of contracts used. 
A pure rental contract (RC) is associated with a = 1, � = 1, and r > 0. 
A pure wage contract (WC) is associated with a= 0, � = 0, and r < 0. 
A pure sharecropping contract (SC , a;�) is associated with a e (0, 1), � e (0, 1) and r = 0.2 
If we denote 'Jf(le ), 'JI, > 0, 'JI,, > 0 the disutility of labor for the tenant, his utility level for a 
contract (a, �. r) is, assuming risk neutrality: 
af (le , x) -�x - 'Jf(le ) - r. 
Assuming also risk neutrality for the landlord, the efficient contracts are the solution of the 
program: 
Max (1-a)/ (f,x)- (1-�)x + r (2) 
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S.T. 
af (l,x)-13x -\jl(l) - r = u (/..) 
where u is the alternative level of utility that the tenant can achieve. The interior first order 
conditions of this program are 
or 
a1 A [ a1 A ' A l (1-a) -A (l ,x)+/.. a -A (l ,x)-\jl (l) = 0  
az az 
(I - a) � (f,x)- (1-�)+A [ a� (f,x)-�l = O  
1-/..= 0  
a1 A ' A a1 A -A (l ,x) = \jl (l )  and - (l ,x) = 1 
az ax 
i.e., the efficient allocation of resources. 
i.e., 
If f *, x * denote the efficient allocation of resources (a, 13, r) must be chosen so that: 
af (l*,x*)- j3x* - \jl(l*)-r = u 
a= l,13= 1 
a= 0,13= 0 
r = f (l*,x*)-13x* -v(f*) - u 
r = -u - \jl(l*) 
for a RC 
for a WC 








Let us assume that because of imperfections in the credit market, the working capital R of 
the tenant is limited. In defining an optimal contract, we must add the constraint:3 
j3x*+r�R 
If we normalize by choosing r = 0, we see that (9) imposes 






Rental contracts and sharecropping contracts with a high share of the product given to the 
tenant are excluded by the financial constraint. An extremely poor tenant may even be pushed down 
to a wage contract. If tenants prefer contracts with the largest sharing of contract (which is a 
measure of their liberty), (9) and (10) will be tight. (10) predicts a positive correlation between a 
and R . Indeed we find an extremely significant correlation 
a= 376.4 + 0.034 R 
(8.9) (7.6) 
n = 65 
(11) 
However, the above model suggests that the financial constraint does not interfere with an 
efficient allocation of resources. But, we find an extremely positive correlation between production 
and p 
y = -32.4 + 1.31 p 
(4.55) (11.56) 
for the contracts with a= 1/2 (n = 12). 
(12) 
Observe that in this section we have assumed that landlords were able to monitor perfectly 
effort and could choose the level of efficiency units of labor. We pursue the analysis in the next 
section by assuming that effort levels are unobservable. 
4. Contracting with Financial Constraints and Moral Hazard 
We continue to assume that material inputs x and labor, l ,  are observable and consequently 
can be chosen by the landlord. However, e is chosen by the tenant, hence, the constraint.4 
df ' a -A (le ,x) = 'V(le) 
dl 
(13) 
If there was no financial constraint, risk neutrality would enable the landlord to achieve an 
efficient allocation of resources by choosing a rental contract (a = 1 ). Then, the tenant benefits of all 
of his effort and chooses a socially optimal level. 
Let us now state the landlord's optimization program when both a financial constraint for the 
tenant and the moral hazard constraint (13) exist. 
Max (1 -a)f (le ,x)- (1- p)x + r (14) 
S.T. 
af (le , x) - Px -r - 'lf(le) � u (15) 
R - (3.x - r � O  




As we assume now that the financial constraint is binding, (16) can be used to substitute the 
value of r to give: 
S.T. 
Max (1 -a)f (le, x) - x + R 
(a, le , x) 
af (le , x) -'l'Ue ) � ii + R (A. ) 




(I- a) � (le, x)+A. [ a� (le, x)-o/(le)] +µ [ a�:� (le, x)-11f(le)] -o (21) 
� � a� (1 - a) -a (le, x) -1 +A. a -a (le , x) + µ a -A - (le , x) = o (22) x x a1ax 
-f (le , x) +'Ai (le , x) + µ a� (le , x) = 0 (23) d[ 




The allocation is now inefficient. Becauseµ> 0,5 the quantity of labor in efficiency units is 
too low; the quantity of material inputs is also too low (if labor and material inputs are not 
complementary) with an ambiguous result if they are complementary. 
The financial constraint puts a limit to the tenant's personal investment. The only way then 
to constrain the tenant to his individual rationality level ii is to decrease his share of output. But this 
decreases his level of effort, creating the inefficiency. Note that for R low enough, the landlord 
might prefer to not saturate the individual rationality constraint (A. = 0) and leave to the tenant a 
share of output inducing a minimal level of effort. 
Actually, there is an alternative to this last policy which is to bear the costs required by a 
careful monitoring. 
So, we may expect (if we assume momentarily that the tenant's IR level of utility is 
independent of his working capital), that the level of utility of the landlord is decreasing when the 
tenant's working capital R decreases (and therefore the share of output he gets decreases). There 
comes a point at which the landlord prefers to switch to a wage contract with the associated 
monitoring costs (see figure 1).6 






Remark 1: In practice the landlord will apply a level of monitoring which increases continuously as 
the share left to the tenant decreases and the incentive problem worsens. 
Remark 2: We may also expect (depending on the relative numbers of landlords and tenants) that the 
tenants with a lot of working capital will be able to extract more income than the others. In figure 1 
we have assumed that the bargaining power was in the hands of landlords, tenants being all kept at 
the ii level. The other extreme situation would be the one where landlords would be kept at the 
same level and the increase of utility due to more effort (due to higher shares (due to higher working 
capital)) would benefit tenants. 
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The model so obtained is therefore compatible with the coexistence of all types of contracts, 
with a positive correlation between the working capital and the share of output retained by the 
tenant, and with an inefficiency decreasing with that same share. 
Consider a Cobb-Douglas specification of the production function 
Logy = a  Log l + a  Log e + b Log x 
From the theory above, e is an increasing function of R , \jf(R ). 
Logy = a Log l + b Log x + a Log \jf(R ) 
As it is difficult to be more specific about the function 'I' we will estimate various functional 
forms of the type 
Logy = a  Log l + b Log x + c <l>(R) 
and test the significance of c . 
Logy = -2.49 + .32 Log l + .49 Log x + .21 Log R 
(-16.8) (2.29) (3.77) (13.52) 
n = 37 
If we restrict the analysis to fixed rent contracts, effort should always be at its optimal value 
and output be independent of wealth. Indeed, we get, 
Logy = -3.3 + .37 Log l + .46 Log x + .25 Log R 
(-6.2) (2.2) (2.7) (1.4) 
n = 20 
For share contracts only we obtain: 
Logy = -2.4 + .48 Log l + .43 Log x + .10 Log R 
(-16.2) (3.7) (3.3) (4.4) 
n = 17 
Then regressions suggest that a 100% increase in working capital of tenants (made possible 
for example by a better credit system) would yield a 10% increase of production. These efficiency 
gains would come from a new structuring of contracts with higher sharing coefficients for tenants. 
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The above regressions have been run using production per plot ignoring the size of the plot 
(which would be all right if labor and land were strict complement for example a production function 
such as y = [min(t, le )]a xb where t stands for land). To allow for more general production 
functions (y = (le )a xb tc) we also run the regression measuring inputs and output per unit of 
surface (here hectare). 
For share contracts we obtain (assuming constant return to scale): 
Log (ylt) = -1.9 + 0.54 Log (lit) + 0.34 Log (xlt) + 0.07 Log R 
(-4.1) (3.9) (2.0) (4.9) 
The significance of log R is reinforced under this specification of the production function. 
5. Risk Aversion and Moral Hazard 
An alternative explanation of the positive correlation between a and working capital can be 
given if tenants are risk averse. As risk aversion decreases in general with wealth, agents with more 
wealth and therefore more working capital will take more risk by signing contracts in which they 
retain a higher share of the random output. 
This effect certainly happens, but variations in risk aversion would have to be considerable 
to explain the coexistence of all types of contracts. We will argue below that risk aversion is not a 
major factor explaining the form of contracts. 
If risk aversion mattered, the type of contract would depend on the riskiness of the crop. We 
ran the regression of the type of contract on working capital for crops which are known to be 
associated with quite different levels of risk.7 We find strikingly similar coefficients of R. 
Green vegetable 
a= 226 + 0.044 R n = 34 R2 = 0.45 
(4.2) (5.1) 
Potatoes 
a= 221 + 0.043 R n = 31 R2 = 0.46 
(4.2) (5.4) 
Onions 
a= 208 + 0.045 R n = 31 R2 = 0.47 
(3.5) (5.1) 
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We see a slightly smaller intercept for onions which is the riskiest crop, but for the same 
level of working capital the effect of the larger riskiness is of the order of 15 which is extremely little 
in the scale of a which goes from 1 to 1000. 
6. Financial Constraints of the La.ndlords. 
If the tenant does not have any financial constraint, the optimal contract is the rental 
contract. It remains the solution even if the landlord has financial constraints since this contract does 
not require any financial participation of the landlord. 
Let us consider now the case where the tenant's financial constraint is binding. If W denotes 
the available working capital of the landowner, his optimization program is: 
Max( l - a)f (le , x)-(1-�)x + r 
af (le , x) -� -r - 'Jf(le) ;;:: ii 
R-�x-r;;::o 
df ' a-,. (le , x)- 'Jf (le) = 0 
a1 
W - (1 - �)x + r ;;:: 0 
From the two tight financial constraints we derive: 
x=R +W 
r = (1 -�)R -�w 
The maximization program is reduced to: 
Max(l - a)f (le ,R + W)-W 
af (le ,R + W)-R - w(le);;:: ii (A.) 
a � (le,R +W)- 'ji(le)= O (µ ) 




(1 - a) a:r,. (le ,R + W) +A.[ a a:r,. (le ,R + W)-\jf(le)] az az 
-t(le,R +W)+A.t(le,R +W)+µ a:r,. (le,R +W)=O 
az 
After substitution of (29) into (28), we obtain the same equation to define the marginal 
productivity of labor as in Section 4. However, material inputs are now constrained by the joint 
working capital of the landlord and the tenant. 
We must distinguish two cases: 
Case 1. (26) is binding. Differentiating (26) (27), we get: 
d a= a  at 1ax (-dx) t 
df = 1 [ a a�t - a:r,. . a at 1ax ] (-dx) a2t ,, azax az t a-- w af'2 
(28) 
(29) 
So, starting from the situation with no financial constraint of the landlord and decreasing the 
material inputs (dx < 0), we see that a increases as long as (26) (27) remain binding. 
The effect on the labor allocation depends on the sign of a�t . If labor and material inputs a1ax 
are not complementary [ a�/ < o] . labor is increased. The effect is ambiguous if they are 
azax 
complementary. It is null for a Cobb-Douglas production function. However, the efficiency of the 
production process decreases as it is more constrained. 
Case 2. When the wealth of the landlord is very small, he may prefer not to set the tenant at his IR 
utility level to avoid too adverse incentive effects. We do not consider further this extreme case 
which yields ambiguous answers for both the effect on a and t. 
The main prediction appears to be that the landlord's wealth should have a negative effect on 
the share left to the tenant and a positive effect on production when the contract is a share contract 
and no effect for a rent contract. 
11 
For rent contracts (production per hectare) we obtain: 
Logy It = -2.36 + 0.47 Log (l It)+ 0.44 Log (x It ) 
(-14.7) (3.5) (3.3) 
+ 0.09 Log R + 0.008 Log W 
(2.6) (0.4) 
If we relax the assumption of constant return to scale (i.e., a production function of the type 
y = k ·(le )a xb tc) we obtain for rent contracts: 
Log (y It )= -0.3 + 0.41 Log (lit)+ 0.13 Log (xlt ) 
(-1.02) (6.8) (1.7) 
-0.14 Log t + 0.085 Log R + 0.054 Log W 
(-7.6) (5.6) (5.3) 
This estimation rejects the assumption of constant return to scale and yields, 
a + 6 + c = 0.86, i.e. decreasing returns to scale. 
Finally, we obtain the expected signs in the regression explaining shares. 
a= 584 + 0.024 R - 0.020 W 
(17.3) (8.00) (-8.4) 
n =60 
Since a takes only a few values (0, 1/3, 1/2, 1) we also estimate this equation by a Tobit­
maximum likelihood method and we find similar results: 
a= 585 + 0.025 R - 0.026 W 
(14.2) (6.8) (-11.0) 
As a is measured between 0 and 1000, we find that a is about 1/2 with corrections due to 
financial constraints of either the tenant or the landlord. It is interesting to note that if we assumed 
that tenant and landlord had the same constant absolute risk aversion (without any financial 
constraint) the optimal a would be 1/2. A more complete theory would include risk aversion to 
justify a certain level of a modified by financial constraints. 
To confirm our view that levels of risk aversion are low, we estimate the share equations for 
crops with different risks, including the landlord's wealth. We obtain: 
Green vegetable 
a= 489.2 + 0.031 R - 0.019 W 
(10.7) (5.7) (-7.1) 
n = 298 
(and with a Tobit specification) 
Potatoes 
a= 488 + 0.037 R - 0.030 W 
(7.2) (6.9) (-8.6) 
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a= 488.4+ 0.031R - 0.018 W R2= 0.71 
(10) (5.9) (-6.7) 
(and with a Tobit specification) 
Onions 
a= 485.0 + 0.038 R - 0.027 W 
(7.1) (7.2) (-7.1) 
a.= 537.1 + 0.031R - 0.020 W 
(9.9) (5.3) (-7.1) 
(and with a Tobit specification) 
a= 536 + 0.037 R - 0.032 W 
(7.1) (6.3) (-8.2) 
7. Historical Evolution of Sharecropping 
n = 318 
n = 268 
The next piece of evidence that can be explained by our hypothesis is the evolution of the 
proportion of share contracts from 12.1 % before 1970 to 73.8% after 1970, the other contracts being 
wage contracts. 
A major phenomenon since 1970 is a tremendous increase in the government controlled 
wage rate. The great increase in sharecropping appears therefore as the adjustment process by which 
the minimum wage is bypassed. 
For our sample of sharecroppers, the effective wage rate is 1.8 Dinar per day when the wage 
rate is 3.5. In figure l ,  it amounts to push down the utility level which can be obtained by the 
landlord below to the dotted line, increasing the area of sharecropping. 
The workers who have very little capital do not see however their welfare increase because 
some unemployment of their labor force appears as a consequence of this wage rate above the 
market level. The other inefficiency created is the use of sharing contracts with very low shares for 
the tenant which either imply a very low effort level or give rise to more monitoring expenses. 
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8. Conclusion 
We developed a theory of sharecropping which emphasizes the dual role of moral hazard 
and financial constraints. The unobservability of effort requires the use of incentive contracts to 
induce good effort levels. This can easily be achieved with rental-contracts which leave to tenants 
all the proceeds of their effort. However, tenants' financial constraints make these contracts often 
impossible. The poorer the tenant the smaller the share of the crop he will retain and therefore the 
less effort he will provide. 
The special feature of our data which includes financial elements has enabled us to give 
some empirical evidence to this theory. Working capital appears as a significant explanation of the 
type of contract chosen by a tenant and of the level of production achieved on a plot. The alternative 
explanation related to a level of risk aversion decreasing with wealth does not appear to provide an 
explanation of the large variations in the observed sharing rules. 
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Footnotes 
1. The solution proposed by Cheung (1968) amounts to assume that labor intensity can be chosen 
by the tenant. Bardhan and Srinivasan (1971), in an otherwise unsatisfactory model, correctly 
stress that the landlord cannot decide how much labor the sharecropper puts in his land. Shaban 
(1987) provides empirical evidence against the idea that landlords can completely monitor 
effort. 
2. As material inputs are assumed observable, there is no useful distinction between ax and r 
when r is positive. Only ax + r matters. Then we can nonnalize by setting r = 0. 
3. The role of landlords' financial constraints will be examined in Section 6. 
4. As f is concave in f and 'I' convex, the first order condition (13) is sufficient to characterize the 
choice of effort level. 
5. Look at (21), use (20), the concavity off and the convexity of'JI. 
6. Actually, we observe only the value of 112 and 113 for the parameter ex.. The adjustment of (8) 
can be realized by r , 13 being then detennined by (9). Also in practice, all plots do not have the 
same productivity and require different values of the parameter for the same financial 
constraints. 
7. Farmers rank the riskiness of crops as follows: green vegetables (low risk), potatoes (medium 
risk), onions (high risk). 
8. The number of observations is smaller than in previous sections. Some wage earners had to be 
dropped from the sample because our data did not enable us to find their associated landlord. 
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